Results JammerTest 2026 – GNSS Under Attack: What the Data Reveals

The announcement of a results session on GNSS jamming and spoofing testing is easy to read as routine conference programming. It is not. The fact that an industry event can be organized around a single question — what happens to navigation when the satellite signal is contested — tells us how far the problem has moved from the margins of electronic warfare planning into the center of platform design and acquisition. A decade ago, GNSS denial was treated as a specialized concern for precision-guided munitions and a handful of high-value platforms. Today it is a baseline environmental assumption for almost everything that moves and many things that do not.

The mechanics are well understood in outline and stubbornly difficult in practice. GNSS signals arrive at the receiver extremely weak, which makes them susceptible both to brute-force jamming, which denies position and timing, and to spoofing, which feeds false signals that a receiver may accept as valid. The distinction matters enormously for the operator: jamming announces itself through lost lock and degraded accuracy, while spoofing can produce confident but wrong outputs, a far more dangerous failure mode because it corrupts the decision chain rather than interrupting it. Testing that separates these cases, and measures not just whether a receiver is affected but how it detects, reports, and recovers, is the kind of evidence that requirement writers and evaluators have been missing. Comparable, repeatable data across vendors and architectures is what turns resilience from a marketing claim into a verifiable attribute.