Electronic Warfare
GNSS spoofing class vs Pole-21
Jamming blocks satellite navigation; spoofing feeds it lies. Comparing a spoofing class entry against Russia's Pole-21 denial system clarifies the distinction military planners draw between navigation deception and navigation denial.
Specification comparison
| Specification | GNSS spoofing class | Pole-21 |
|---|---|---|
| Role | Deception of GNSS position and timing solutions | Suppression of GPS, GLONASS, Galileo and BeiDou signals |
| Contrast | Spoofing injects false signals where jamming merely blocks them, public analyses | Not publicly disclosed |
| Bands | GPS/GLONASS/Galileo/BeiDou L-band segments, class-level | GNSS L-band segments, public estimates |
| Configurations | Fixed, vehicle and shipboard emitters reported, class-level | Not publicly disclosed |
| Reported reach | Not publicly disclosed | Up to 80 km class, public estimates |
| Emitter | Not publicly disclosed | R-340RP jamming modules, public reports |
| Mounting | Not publicly disclosed | Modules fitted to existing cellular masts, public reports |
| Modules per site | Not publicly disclosed | Up to 100, public reports |
Values are reproduced exactly as recorded in the DroneZone systems database. Where a figure is absent from the public record, it is marked “Not publicly disclosed” rather than estimated.